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BOOK REVIEW
THE MYTH OF THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
Randy M, Mastro*
The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed the
Lawsuit. By Walter K. Olson.** Truman Talley Books. Dutton, 1991.
Pp. 338. $24.95
"Lawyer bashing" is a time-honored tradition. For instance, the "first
thing" they wanted to do in Shakespeare's day was "kill all the law-
yers."' That sentiment persists today. Indeed, recent surveys show that,
of all professionals, lawyers are held in the lowest esteem.2
Now, Walter Olson chooses to reiterate this tired theme in his book,
The Litigation Explosion.3 One would expect such a treatise-"written
primarily for the nonlawyer, and by one" 4 -to fade into obscurity. This
book, however, has not only made the rounds on the media circuit;5 it
has won kudos from within the legal community.6 No less an authority
than former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger
praised it as "a valuable contribution to the public interest."7
I was intrigued. After all, this purported to be an objective look at
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ciate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, New York, N.Y.; B.A. cum laude 1978, Yale Univer-
sity; J.D. 1981, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney,
S.D.N.Y., 1985-87; Deputy Chief, Civil Division, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., 1987-
89. The author wishes to thank Michael DeSimone and Lawrence J. La Sala for their
invaluable contributions to this piece.
** Senior Fellow, The Manhattan Institute, New York, N.Y.
1. W. Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, act IV, scene II, lines 82-85, reprinted in The
Complete Works of William Shakespeare (W. Clark & W. Wright eds. 1931).
2. See Snyder, Revolt Against the Professionals, Adweek's Marketing Week, Feb. 25,
1991, at 24.
3. W. Olson, The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed
the Lawsuit (1991) [hereinafter Litigation Explosion].
4. Ia at 11.
5. See, ,,g., Umps, OfAll People Need Thick Skins, Chi. Trib., Aug. 17, 1991, at 18,
col. 1 (discussing Olson's book and thesis in context of major league umpire's defamation
suit against Cincinnati Reds' manager Lou Piniella); Oprah (ABC television broadcast,
June 26, 1991) (Walter Olson and Alan Dershowitz interviewed) (transcript on file with
Fordharn Law Review); Birnbaum, Crybabies: Eternal Victims, Time, Aug. 12, 1991, at
16-17 (citing Olson in support of proposition that "[h]ypersensitivity and special pleading
are making a travesty of the virtues that used to be known as individual responsibility and
common sense"); Oliver, Let the Loser Pay, Forbes, Mar. 18, 1991, at 96-97 (interview
with Walter Olson).
6. See Burger, Too Many Lawyers Too Many Suits, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1991, § 7,
at 12, col. 1; Bork, Litigation Explodes With Well-Told Tale of Unleashing the Lawsuit,
Wash. Times, Apr. 29, 1991, at Fl; see also Andrews, Book Review, Nat'l Rev., June 10,
1991, at 42 (attorney describes Olson's book as "the clearest explanation yet of why the
legal system went haywire").
7. Burger, supra note 6, at 13, col. 3.
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what I do for a living8 It turned out, instead, to be a right-wing mani-
festo full of purple prose and misguided notions about how our legal sys-
tem works and ought to work.
Olson starts from the defensible premise that the United States is ex-
periencing a "litigation explosion" that is a "disaster."9 He then argues
for a series of regressive and draconian changes-such as fee shifting, 10
attorney liability," increased burdens of proof,'2 and limited discov-
ery 13-that would necessarily discourage and prevent plaintiffs from fil-
ing civil suits.' 4
Olson makes little attempt to hide his ideological biases. He is un-
abashedly pro-business' 5 and pro-defendant.' 6 He views civil litigation
as an evil because it is bad for business. Indeed, he waxes eloquently that
the "unleashing" of litigation "clogs and jams the gears of commerce,
sowing friction and distrust between the productive enterprises on which
material progress depends and all who buy their products, work at their
plants and offices, [and] join in their undertakings."' 7 Moreover, Olson
derides those who consider litigation an opportunity to vindicate rights.
In his view, " 'life would be intolerable if every man insisted on his legal
rights to the full.' 8
If Olson's pronouncements have a familiar ring, that is because we
8. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 6, at 12, col. I (while "some members of the legal
profession may challenge [Olson's] qualifications to address this subject ... a well in-
formed layman like [Olson], looking at the broad picture, can perhaps see what some of
us within the profession do not see -or do not want to see"); Haspel, Book Review,
N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1991, at 2, col. 3 ("The Litigation Explosion provides a valuable view
from ... outside of [the legal] system").
9. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 1-2. Some studies and academics, however,
have questioned whether the litigation explosion presumed by Olson has even occurred.
According to a study by the National Center for State Courts, "total tort suit filings have
barely out-paced the nation's rate of population growth." Siegal, Too Many Lawyers Too
Much Litigation, Newsday, May 1. 1991, at 54, col. 1. Moreover, a Rand Corporation
study has shown that 44% of all product liability cases brought in federal courts in the
1980's concerned asbestos. See Guzzardi, Up In Arms Over the American Way of Law,
Fortune, May 20, 1991, at 151; see also Galen, How the Courtroom Became a Casino, Bus.
Week, May 13, 1991, at 12 (noting that "federal court records from 1985 to 1989 show
that personal-injury product liability filings, with the exception of asbestos cases, de-
creased by 37.5%"); Siegal, supra, at 54, col. 1 (noting that the General Accounting
Office has found that, not including the asbestos, Dalkon Shield and benedectin cases,
product liability filings in federal court have grown more slowly than consumer spend-
ing); Taylor, Thomas Henderson, Am. Law., Mar. 1989, at 136 (noting signs that "the
current trend is against runaway imposition of tort liability"); cf Margolis, Letter to the
Editor, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1991, § 7, at 30, col. 2 (arguing that the "real surge in court
business has come from criminal, not civil, cases").
10. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 329-38.
11. See id at 326-29.
12. See id. at 345-46.
13. See id. at 314-15.
14. See infra notes 42-49, 80-97 and accompanying text.
15. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 2, 198, 200.
16. See id. at 108, 272, 293.
17. Id at 2.
18. Id. at 223 (quoting F. Pollock, Jurisprudence, but not citing any specific page).
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have heard this all before from conservative politicians and jurists look-
ing to close off the courts as an avenue of redress for individual rights. 19
It is not at all surprising that Olson holds such views. The Manhattan
Institute from which he hails is a conservative "think tank" founded by
former CIA director William J. Casey.2" Some critics, in fact, have
branded its position papers "skillfully publicized rehash of long-stated
conservative positions."'"
This book falls well within that categorization. It would be easily dis-
missed as an uninformed layman's ranting and raving if not for the fact
that it appears to reflect a growing sentiment, even within the legal pro-
fession, that we litigators are the cause, rather than the cure, of many of
our society's ills.' Moreover, the book warrants closer scrutiny because
it propagates the myth that litigation is inherently bad and therefore
needs to be curtailed.2 3
Olson cavalierly proposes placing severe limitations on one of our soci-
ety's most fundamental rights-namely, the right to have an impartial
19. For example, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
cautioned: "We are in a position where we must think not about new causes of action,
but of remitting to state courts some of the business now handled by the federal courts,
and of revising the way of handling some of the business which is retained by federal
courts." Rehnquist Urges Limits on Burden of Federal Courts, Manhattan Law., Feb. 14-
20, 1989, at 16 (providing text of speech delivered by Rehnquist to the American Bar
Association on February 6, 1989); see also Margolick, Address By Quayle on Justice Prao-
posals Irks Bar Association, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al, col. 2 (reporting on Vice
President Dan Quayle's speech to the American Bar Association in which Quayle en-
dorsed many of the reforms that Olson urges in his book).
20. See Think Tank: The Carousels of Power, The Economist, May 25-31, 1991, at
23, 24; Gottlieb, Conservative Policy Unit Takes Aim at New York, N.Y. Times, May 5,
1986, at B4, cols. 1-2; McClenahen, Outposts of Private Enterprise, Indus. Week, Sep. 30,
1985, at 72, 73. But see From the Right New Hope For Cities, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 23,
1989, at 51, col. 3 (Peter Salins of Manhattan Institute described Institute as "strictly
nonpartisan").
21. Gottlieb, supra note 20, at B4, col. 2.
22. For example, in a recent speech to the American Bar Association, Vice President
Dan Quayle-himself a law school graduate-raged that lawyers and the legal system
were responsible for placing the United States at a competitive disadvantage in world
industrial markets. See Margolick, supra note 19, at Al, col. 2; see also American Com-
petitiveness, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at A8, col. 1 (editorial supporting position taken
by Quayle); Less Litigation, More Justice, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1991, at A8, col. 3 (report-
ing proposals made by the President's Council on Competitiveness, working group on
Federal Civil Justice Reform, to counter current "use and abuse of the legal system");
Fields, Curing Litigious Preyers of Pain, Wash. Times, May 16, 1991, at G1 (Commen-
tary) (blaming lawyers for, among other things, the rise of children dying from whooping
cough); Brimelow & Spencer, The PlaintiffAttorneys' Great Honey Rush, Forbes, Oct. 16,
1989, at 197, 202-03 (labelling plaintiffs' lawyers as "the real champions of the great
American greed game" and blaming lawyers for crisis in the insurance industry).
23. On numerous occasions, the United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected
and attempted to dispel this myth. See, eg., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985) ("we cannot endorse the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is
an evil"); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) ("we cannot accept the
notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by
legal action").
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jury resolve our disputes with each other and with our government.24
Our courts have long been a vehicle for necessary social reform when the
executive and legislative branches, whether by choice or by cowardice,
have failed to act.25 Olson sees this virtue as a vice.
The retrenchment that Olson urges has already begun. Over the past
decade the judiciary has unquestionably become more conservative.26
Right-wing politicians now derisively dub courts doing what they are
supposed to do as "judicial activism, ' 27 while arch-conservatives like 01-
24. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 1-11, 292-93, 297-16, 339-48.
25. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing minimum
procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination
for persons taken into custody); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding
school segregation to be unconstitutional); Southern Burlington County NAACP. v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (establishing that municipalities'
land use regulations must provide realistic opportunity for building of low or moderate
income housing), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); see also Coyle, A Final Victory Marks
the End of a Career, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 13, 1990, at S4 ("the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution [is] 'the protection of the human being and the recognition that every indi-
vidual has fundamental rights which the government cannot deny him,"' (quoting Jus-
tice William Brennan)).
26. As one commentator has noted, "the [Reagan] administration's methodology in
choosing [federal judges] represented a sharp break with tradition. No longer was loyalty
to the party, or trial and litigating experience, as important as was well-documented fe-
alty to conservative ideology." Freiwald, The Mission." Stock Bench, Am. Law., May/
June 1988, at 6, 7 (special supplement); see also Wermiel, Full-Court Review of Panel
Rulings Becomes Tool Often Used By Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 22, 1988, at 70, col. 1 (noting that en banc review "has become a weapon for some
Reagan appointees seeking to steer federal courts in a more conservative direction");
Brimelow, Judicial Imperialism, Forbes, June 1, 1987, at 109, 112 (noting that "several
studies have shown that Reagan judges are more likely to support the 'conservative' side
in a variety of areas than Carter or Nixon appointees"). Furthermore, because both the
Reagan and Bush administrations have been able to appoint so many federal judges, a
conservative legacy will long remain with the federal courts. See Neal, Reagan to Have
Lasting Legacy on Courts, Proprietary to UPI, Sept. 4, 1988 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni
file). Simply at the federal appellate level, the Reagan administration appointed nearly
half of the active federal circuit court judges. See Note, The Politics of En Banc Review,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 864, 865 n.4 (1989) (citing H. Schwartz, Packing the Courts: The
Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution 150 (1988)). In fact, among non-
senior judges, Reagan and Bush appointees now hold majorities in every Circuit except
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. See 929 F.2d VII, VII-XXVII (1991) (listing federal
judiciary and dates of appointment); see generally Reagan Justice. A Conservative Legacy
on the Appellate Courts, Am. Law., May/June 1988, at 1-54 (special supplement) (review-
ing each federal circuit and discussing how former President Reagan stocked the appel-
late bench with conservative appointees).
27. See, e.g., Elsasser, Thanks to Bush and Old Age, Conservatives Will Win the
Supreme Court, Chi. Trib., Jan. 22, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1 (noting President-elect Bush's
opposition to "judicial activism" and promise to "appoint people to the federal bench
that will not legislate from the bench"); Reagan Justice, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that in
1980 candidate Ronald Reagan vowed to end "what he called 50 years of 'judicial activ-
ism' "); Caplan, Why the Law Gets No Respect, Wash. Post, Sep. 20, 1987, at C2, col. 1
(noting comment by then Solicitor General Charles Fried that "judicial activism ...
represented an attitude that led to lawlessness"); Lewis, Abroad At Home; The Court:
Scalia, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at A23, col. I (noting Justice Scalia's criticism of
judicial activism); Schachter, U.S. Judge Stresses Reliance on Constitution's "Original In-
tent", Los Angeles Times, Nov. 19, 1985, pt. 2, at 2, col. 4 (noting then U.S. Court of
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son stoke the fires of public discontent with selective accounts of litiga-
tion abuses.
These few abuses, however, do not warrant wholesale changes in our
judicial system. Let us not be fooled. This attack on litigation is part of
a larger political agenda. Olson and his ilk want to bar the courthouse
door precisely because litigators have succeeded in using the courts as a
vehicle for social reform.
While it is true that our courts currently have more cases than they
can efficiently handle, the answer is surely not to chop plaintiffs at the
knees and effectively prevent them from being able to stand in court.
Rather, the answer is to increase our commitment to the judicial branch
and thereby ensure greater access. We deserve no less. Sadly, we may
only realize that fact after the axe has fallen.
I. LAWYERS As LrrIGANTS
At the outset of his book, Olson argues that "we changed the rules in
our courtrooms to encourage citizens to sue each other" and that "the
changes amount to a unique experiment in freeing the legal profession
and the litigious impulse from age-old constraints."'  Looked at another
way, one could say that we simply relaxed rigid procedural and substan-
tive rules to permit potential litigants the opportunity to have their dis-
putes resolved by an impartial tribunal. That approach, however, is far
too reasonable for Olson's liking.
According to Olson, these changes have ushered in an era where law-
yers themselves function as litigants.29 In support of this proposition, he
first points to the lifting of the ban on attorney advertising and client
solicitation.3" This, he says, amounted to the "deregulat[ion of] the busi-
Appeals Judge Bork's criticism of judicial activism); Meese Peppers "Chameleon" Judici-
ary, Chi. Trib., Nov. 16, 1985, at 4 (natl ed.) (noting criticism of liberal judicial activism
by then Attorney General Edward Meese); Weinraub, Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies
to Discourage Judicial Activism, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at Al, coL 3 (noting then
President Reagan's vow to use second term to appoint judges "who understand the dan-
ger of short circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising the people through judi-
cial activism"). But see Kaplan & Cohn, Good For the Left Now Good For the Right,
Newsweek, July 8, 1991, at 20 (noting that Supreme Court has not abolished "judicial
activism," but under Chief Justice Rehnquist has engaged in conservative judicial activ-
ism); Malecki, Editorial, Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1989, pt. 2, at 6, col 3 (same).
28. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 1.
29. See id at 5.
30. See id at 21-3 1. But see Meyerowitz, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, June 23,
1991, § 7, at 30, col. 2 (defending legal advertising and noting that "[w]e all should be
able to make informed judgments about the legal services we may need to buy based on as
much information as possible"). See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-47 (1985) (upholding the solicitation of legal business through
"truthful and nondeceptive" advertisements containing advice and information regarding
specific legal problems); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-379, 384 (1977)
(upholding truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of legal services
and refuting many of the same arguments against legal advertising now proffered by 01-
1991]
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ness of litigation."31
With lawyers permitted to "pound the pavement" for business, they
have propagated what Olson considers to be a pernicious evil: the class
action.32 Olson contends that class actions are nothing more than "glori-
fied clientless litigation" for the "aspiring drummer-up of litigation" who
solicits "not just by ones and twos, but by carloads and counties."33
In reality, however, class actions serve the interests of similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs, whose individual claims may be too small to justify the
expense of filing an otherwise meritorious lawsuit but whose aggregate
claims more than justify suit. 4 Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel in such
son, including the arguments that advertising will stir up litigation and have an adverse
effect on the economy).
31. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 1. It is ironic that Olson decries the "der-
egulat[ion of] the business of litigation" when those who share his conservative political
views ordinarily urge the deregulation of business. See, e.g., Mandel, Education Reform
Movement Pushes Choice, Investor's Daily, Feb. 22, 1991, at 36, col. 6 (Manhattan Insti-
tute's Director of Educational Innovation supporting public school choice movement);
Rubenstein, Why Rich New York is So Poor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1991, § 3, at 13, col. 1
(Manhattan Institute fellow criticizes New York State welfare system); Passell, Per-
estroika For Renters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1991, at D2, col. 1 (Manhattan Institute's Peter
Salins argues for the deregulation of rent control); Moderate-Priced Housing: Must City
Be Forever Short of Affordable Living Space?, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, § 4, at 6, col. 1
(same); Page, Let's Get Small, Says Social-Policy Guru Charles Murray, Chi. Trib., Dec.
11, 1988, § 14, at 8, cols. 3-4 (reviewing book by Manhattan Institute fellow calling for
dismantling of federal welfare system). See generally From the Right, supra note 20, at
51, col. 3 (Manhattan Institute's Peter Salins discusses the institute's free market philoso-
phy); McClenahen, supra note 20, at 72 (describing Manhattan Institute's philosophy as
"the government that governs best governs least").
32. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 56-66.
33. Id. at 57, 66. Olson is not the first author to chronicle class action abuses. See,
e.g., Macey & Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litiga-
tion: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7-8
(1991) (arguing that class actions are dominated by "'entrepreneurial' plaintiffs' attor-
neys" who "operate largely according to their own self-interest"); Cofee, The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness & Efficiency in the Large Class Action,
54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883-89 (1987) (discussing conflict of interest between en-
trepreneurial class attorneys and class members as an "agency cost" problem of class
actions); Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66
Tex. L. Rev. 385, 390-96 (1987) (discussing potential conflicts of interest and the need for
improved management in class actions); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan.
L. Rev. 1183, 1205 & n.87 (1982) (while "many individual attorneys have proved highly
conscientious" in their class representation, "prudential and ideological" motivations
play a dominant role in shaping class attorneys' conduct); Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class
Action Settlements." The Need For a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84
Mich. L. Rev. 308, 314-16 (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter Note, Abuse in Class Action Settle-
ments] (discussing potential conflicts of interest between class attorney and class mem-
bers). But see Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem", 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664, 665-67 (1979) (recognizing "instances
of undesirable or unprofessional conduct" but disputing claims of widespread class action
abuse).
34. This basic fact has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in a
majority opinion by no less a critic of the legal system than Chief Justice Rehnquist. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (class actions
"permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would [otherwise] be uneconomical to litigate
204 [Vol. 60
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suits do not "wag[e] litigation purely and openly on their own behalf," as
Olson suggests.35 Indeed, their actions are subject to rigorous scrutiny
by the judges who preside over such suits and by the class members who
must receive notice of seminal events in the litigation. 36 Hence, far from
running their own shows, plaintiffs' counsel in class action suits assume
added legal and ethical obligations to protect the interests of the class.37
individually. For example, [because] this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $100
per plaintifit] most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action
were not available"); accord Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 n.9
(1980); see also Miller, supra note 33, at 665 n.3 (endorsing this view and contending that
"the alleged deficiencies of the class action have been overstated").
35. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 66.
36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (allowing court in class action suit to "make appropriate
orders ... for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct
of the action"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring that "a class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court"). Furthermore, in the vast majority
of jurisdictions, a plaintiffs' class cannot be certified until the judge determines that all the
prerequisites of a class action are met. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 809; General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982); East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977). In most cases, this means that a judge must first
determine that an adequately defined class exists, see Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982), and that (i) the class is so numerous
that joinder would be impractical, (ii) questions of law or fact are common to the class,
(iii) the claims or defenses of the representative party are typical of the class, and (iv) the
representative party will adequately protect the class' interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a);
see also 3 H. Newberg, On Class Actions 16-19 (2d ed. cum. supp. 1990) (noting that 40
states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have adopted class action rules
similar or identical to the federal rules).
37. In addition, lawyers have little practical incentive to "drum up" frivolous class
action litigation.
On the one hand, the cost of maintaining class action suits can be enormous, with that
cost frequently borne by the class attorney. See Lynch, Ethical Rules in F7ux: Advancing
Costs of Litigation, 7 Litig. 19, 20 (Winter 1981); Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action
Settlements, supra note 33, at 314 & n.34; Note, Due Process and Equitable Relief in State
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 415, 444
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Due Process and Equitable RelieA; see also Cooper & Kirkham,
Class Action Conflicts, 7 Litig. 35, 36 (Winter 1981) (explaining that the claim that law-
yers create class actions simply to generate fees "rests on some false pretenses and ignores
hard realities," given the economic burdens borne by class counsel); Taylor, supra note 9,
at 132 (noting that plaintiffs' lawyer Thomas Henderson personally spent $250,000 in
assisting in the Agent Orange litigation). For example, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiffs' class representative must bear
the cost of notice to all class members, notice to identifiable class members cost $225,000,
and additional expenses were required for the publication of notice designed to reach the
four million non-identifiable class members. See 417 U.S. 156, 167 (1974). Similarly, in
the Agent Orange toxic tort litigation, plaintiffs' class expenses exceeded ten million dol-
lars. See Note, Due Process and Equitable Relief, supra, at 445-46.
On the other hand, the risk of potential sanctions under Federal Rule 11 serves as a
deterrent to frivolous or meritless suits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also infra note 89
(explaining provisions of Rule 11); Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189,
200 (1988) (noting that plaintiffs' counsel have been particularly affected by Rule 11). As
one study has documented, plaintiffs were the targets in 78.8% of the cases in which Rule
11 sanctions were requested, and plaintiffs were actually sanctioned in 59.6% of the cases
in which they were the targets of a Rule 11 motion. See id at 200. Moreover, Rule 11
has been disproportionately invoked in types of litigation that are typically brought as
class actions-namely, in suits involving civil rights, employment discrimination, securi-
1991]
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Olson's attack on class actions in the context of a "litigation explo-
sion" is puzzling. Olson says that the ultimate problem lies in too much
litigation for our society's own good. He then contradicts himself by
attacking class action litigation, which is a primary vehicle for consoli-
dating like cases and conserving judicial resources.38 Its efficiencies,
however, permit ready redress for the misconduct of businesses or gov-
ernments whose transgressions injure whole classes of people. In one
suit, many wrongs can be righted that would likely never have been
righted otherwise.39 That is sufficient reason for Olson to object to class
actions.' It should be reason enough for the rest of us to want to pre-
ties fraud and antitrust. See id. For example, in civil rights and employment discrimina-
tion cases specifically, plaintiffs were sanctioned in an incredible 71.5% of the cases in
which they were targets of a Rule 11 motion. See id. at 200-01.
38. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Deposit Guar. Nat'l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339-40 (1980); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 555-56 (1974); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 (1lth Cir. 1987); Piel v.
National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Elster v. Alexander,
76 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ga. 1977), appeal dismissed, 608 F.2d 196 (1979); see also
Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements, supra note 33, at 311 (noting that "soci-
ety as a whole benefits [from class actions] because class action litigation can ensure
greater compliance with society's laws and regulations and promote efficient use of scarce
judicial resources"); Taylor, supra note 9, at 136 (commenting that class actions and
consolidating the trial of common issues represent "the most realistic hope for more fair
and efficient processing of mass toxic tort claims," specifically because such consolidation
gives judges the power to "hold [down] the plaintiffs' lawyers' fees"); see generally Pro-
posed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D 69,
100-03 (1966) (discussing purpose of class action rule and recognizing that class actions
are intended to "achieve economies of time, effort and expense").
39. As one commentator has stated in arguing for the class treatment of mass tort
claims:
Class treatment.., would enable attorneys to achieve the same economies of
scale that defendants already enjoy. Vast savings in systemic resources could
result from the avoidance of redundant adjudication of currently marketable
claims. The cost-spreading effect of class actions would also provide previously
unmarketable claims access to the system. Thus, by aggregating mass exposure
claims, class actions would enable mass exposure victims to litigate both in the
numbers and with the adversarial strength necessary to achieve the tort sys-
tem's utilitarian and rights-based deterrence objectives as well as its compensa-
tion goals.
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases. A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 908 (1984).
40. Olson writes of class actions: "Now a new ideology had been cobbled together
that glorified clientless litigation as somehow cleaner, nobler, more disinterested, than
litigation on behalf of someone who had actually been hurt badly enough to want to sue."
Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 66. This analysis simply begs the question. As one
commentator has noted in the area of products liability, before toxic tort litigation began
to "unsettle the legal system and capture the imagination of tort reformers, asbestos, the
Dalkon Shield, and other products had ravaged the lungs, reproductive organs, and other
tissues of thousands of Americans." Taylor, supra note 9, at 130. If not for plaintiffs'
class lawyers, "who would police dangerous activities and products to ferret out evidence
about such matters," and how else "would the internal company documents, depositions,
and other evidence showing some major asbestos companies' willingness to put workers
and consumers at risk for the sake of business ever come to light?" Id. at 136. Indeed, to
give federal regulatory approval conclusive effect would "ignore a long history of regula-
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serve them.4'
II. FORM OVER SUBSTANCE
Olson next assaults the procedures for initiating and prosecuting civil
cases. He criticizes notice pleading, which he calls "suing without ex-
plaining."'42 Instead, Olson favors the ancient "writ" method, although
even he admits that historically "writs set many traps for even the well-
trained lawyer and generated technicalities that seemed to have so little
to do with actual justice that many judges were tempted just to ignore
them."43 He then attacks civil discovery, which he says is governed by
the "general rule that revelation is everything and privacy nothing."" In
the alternative, Olson favors the virtual elimination of pre-trial discovery,
even though he acknowledges that such "discovery" is the only means
available for "garnering data relevant to a client's case."4
Of course, without notice pleading and discovery, a plaintiff would
somehow have to obtain all of the information necessary to prove his or
her claim before even filing suit. This would be a remarkable and proba-
bly impossible feat in the vast majority of cases.
Instead of imposing such an extraordinary burden on plaintiffs, our
legal system permits them to proceed on general allegations that afford
notice of the nature of the action, and then enables them to collect infor-
mation from adversaries and witnesses to flesh out those allegations."
tory failure," as well as "the chronic underfunding, recurrent political subversion, and
industry influence over regulatory agencies." Id.
41. As Justice Douglas once wrote: "The class action is one of the few legal remedies
the small claimant has against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen
his hand with the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as
well as to those liberally endowed with power and wealth." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 186 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also Miller, supra note
33, at 693 ("[g]iven the emotional tone and misdirection of the class action debate during
recent years, the ideological orientation of some of the proposals, and the indications of
increased stabilization in the field, this is an inopportune time to attempt a major revision
of class action practice").
42. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 89.
43. Id. at 95.
44. Id. at 126. What Olson fails to appreciate is that protective orders are commonly
granted to protect the privacy interests of litigants. See Schroeter, Privacy Rights Can
Limit Discovery, Trial, Nov. 1990, at 49-54; see also Fed L Civ. P. 26(c) (Advisory Com-
mittee Note to 1970 Amendment) (noting that courts have "always freely exercised" their
power to regulate discovery through protective orders).
45. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 120. Olson misses another crucial point-
namely, that discovery "is not a one-way proposition." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
507 (1947). It is available to all parties and "may work to the disadvantage as well as to
the advantage of individual plaintiffs." Id
46. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Taylor v.
Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 180-81 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("attorneys must be
free to assert claims when the facts and law are less than certain [and] ... must be free to
utilize discovery processes afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to explore
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Implicit in this approach is the assumption that a plaintiff cannot possi-
bly know all of the facts without discovery. 7 For this reason, our system
permits the disclosure of any information that "appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."48
Civil discovery is a truth-seeking device. Olson wants none of that.
He would prefer to end the process before it even begins. In essence, he
values expedition over "actual justice."49
To bolster his case for procedural reform, Olson claims that courts
favor plaintiffs in choice of forum 0 and law." The case law, however,
does not support his claim. 2
First, Olson cites the "long-established constitutional right not to be
sued except at home."53 But no such constitutional right ever existed.54
and develop facts to support established or reasonable extensions of established legal
theories").
47. As the Supreme Court noted in Hickman v. Taylor, discovery now serves "as a
device for ascertaining the facts, or the information as to the existence or whereabouts of
facts, relevant to those issues. Thus, civil trials in federal courts no longer need be carried
on in the dark. The way is now clear ... for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." 329 U.S. at 500-01; accord Dollar v. Long
Mfg., N. C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978);
FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 202, 204 (M.D. Fla. 1990); American
Floral Servs., Inc. v. Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n., 107 F.R.D. 258, 260 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Hoffman v. Delta Dental Plan, 517 F. Supp. 574, 575 (D. Minn. 1981); Goss v.
Crossley (In re Hawaii Corp.), 88 F.R.D. 518, 523-24 (D. Haw. 1980); Pierson v. United
States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Del. 1977); Zucker v. Sable, 72 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); see also Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314, 323-24 (C.D.
Cal. 1980) (discovery rules are designed to prevent "trial by ambush").
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Contrary to Olson's contention, discovery is by no
means a "free-for-all." Federal Rule 26(c) authorizes the court, upon the motion of a
party from whom discovery is sought, to "make any order which justice requires to pro-
tect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including... that the discovery not be had." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (authorizing court sua sponte to limit "burdensome" or "duplicative"
discovery). Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as under
state procedural rules, courts can dismiss meritless or defective claims without allowing
any discovery. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (providing for motion to dismiss based on
the pleadings); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (providing for summary judgment, which has res judi-
cata effect); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 3211 (McKinney 1970) (providing for motion to
dismiss prior to the filing of a responsive pleading); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R. 3212(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1991) (providing for summary judgment at any time after the "issue
has been joined").
49. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 95; see also Kirsch, Book Review, A Closing
Argument on the Legal System, L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1991, at E6, col. 5 (noting that
Olson "is a classicist who frankly prefers the good old days when the practice of law was
so rule-bound that many claims and claimants were simply excluded from the courts").
50. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 69-88.
51. See id. at 178-96.
52. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
53. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 87.
54. Even under the Supreme Court's now-overruled and highly restrictive decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Court recognized that states could subject a
non-resident to jurisdiction and service of process if that non-resident entered into a part-
nership or business association within a foreign state or entered into a contract enforcea-
ble in a foreign state. See id. at 735-36.
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While a defendant is, of course, subject to personal jurisdiction in the
defendant's home state and may be sued there, it simply has never been
the rule that a defendant can only be sued in his home state. Moreover, a
plaintiff's choice of forum is not automatically controlling. As a matter
of constitutional law, it has been the rule for more than 45 years that a
defendant must have "minimum contacts" with a forum for that court to
exercise personal jurisdiction. 5 Several states have since imposed even
stricter standards for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 6
Having misapprehended the law of personal jurisdiction, Olson then
claims that courts have become so pro-plaintiff that they now apply to
disputes whatever state's law is "better" for the plaintiff. 7 In this way,
Olson contends, plaintiffs get "the two advantages" of "suing at home"
and "getting the court to apply the other state's stricter law."58
Olson's observation would be appalling if it were true. It is not 59 In-
55. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); accord Burn-
ham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-
72 (1985); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977); see also World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (minimum contacts, as guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause, provides "a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum as-
surance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit"). More-
over, as the Supreme Court noted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant will not attach unless "the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." IaE at 253 (citations omitted). This "purposeful
availment" requirement "ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction
solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated contacts,'" Burger King, 471
U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)), or
because of the "'unilateral activity of another party or a third person.'" Id (quoting
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)).
56. For example, the New York State "long-arm" statute provides that, in addition to
minimum contacts, the cause of action must "arise" from the precise act or acts which
effectively constitute minimum contacts with the forum. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L & R.
302(a)(1) (McKinney 1990); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-59b (West supp. 1991)
(containing same "arising from" requirement for "long-arm" jurisdiction); I. Ann. Stat.
ch. 110, 2-209 (Smith-Hurd supp. 1991) (same); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 17.043 (Vernon 1986) (same).
57. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 193.
58. Id
59. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that a "plaintiff's desire for forum law
is rarely, if ever controlling," Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820 (1985),
because "[l]f a plaintiff could choose the substantive rules to be applied to an action...
the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible. Moreover, it would permit the
defendant's reasonable expectations at the time the cause of action accrues to be frus-
trated.. . ." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 337 (1981) (Powell, J. dissenting).
Thus, as a matter of constitutional law, the Court has held that for a state's substantive
law to apply, "that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair." Id at 313. As the Court noted in Phillips Petroleum, "[e]ven if a plain-
tiff evidences his desire for forum law by moving to the forum, we have generally
accorded such a move little or no significance." 472 U.S. at 820. The Phillips Court
refused to apply Kansas law to a nationwide class action, even though Kansas law was far
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deed, as confirmed by a review of' "conflict of law" issues decided last
year, New York courts far more often chose state law favorable to the
defendants.'o
What Olson seems to forget is that most courts really do try to dis-
pense justice. They are not so easily swayed in deciding issues of law by
the mere domicile of the parties. Litigants deserve a fair fight, and most
courts will permit one. It therefore is absurd for Olson to suggest that
defendants as a class no longer get fair treatment.61
III. SUBSTANCE WITHOUT FORM
Olson also bemoans what he calls "legal uncertainty. ' 62 He chastises
courts for failing "to spell out clear, definite lines of responsibility.
63
This "uncertainty," he says, "'breeds litigation.' "" Yet the primary ex-
amples Olson cites of this supposedly pervasive practice--products liabil-
ity and contract law-provide no support for his premise.
In the products liability area, the law could not be clearer. Olson
more favorable to the plaintiffs. See id. at 815-18, 821-22; see also John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936) (when plaintiff brought suit in Georgia on
insurance contract between New York resident and Massachusetts corporation, Court
rejected application of Georgia law); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930)
(Court rejected application of Texas law to suit over insurance policy issued in Mexico
and by a Mexican insurer to a Mexican citizen, despite fact that plaintiff-assignee was a
Texas resident).
60. For cases applying state law favorable to defendants, see Warshay v. Guinness
PLC, 750 F. Supp. 628, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991); Burgio
v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 865, 866, 872-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Olin Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 743 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd per
curiam, 929 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1991); Huang v. Lee, 734 F. Supp. 71, 74-75 (E.D.N.Y.
1990); Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say. v. Task Assocs., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 64, 68-70
(N.D.N.Y. 1990); Salsman v. Barden & Robeson Corp., 164 A.D.2d 481, 484-86, 564
N.Y.S.2d 546, 547-49 (3d Dep't 1990). But see Department of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying state law favorable to
third-party plaintiffs).
61. In fact, when fashioning constitutional rules regarding personal jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that fairness to defendants is an
important concern. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
113-16 (1987) (barring California's exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ant and noting that "[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a
foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders"); Phillips Petro-
leum, 472 U.S. at 807-08 (examining the burdens faced by non-resident defendants and
noting that because "[t]hese burdens are substantial... the minimum contacts require-
ment of the Due Process Clause prevents the forum State from unfairly imposing them
upon the defendant"); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)
(noting that courts may consider "the burden on the defendant" in determining jurisdic-
tion and that "jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litiga-
tion 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a 'severe
disadvantage in comparison to his opponent'" (citations omitted)).
62. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 151.
63. IdL at 3.
64. Id. at 151 (citing Epstein, Simple Rules For a Complex World, Wall. St. J., June
27, 1985, at 30, col. 3).
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claims that "[lawsuits against manufacturers over injuries in the use of
products, one of the biggest growth areas in litigation, is handled through
one of the most amorphous balancing tests yet invented."65 He is simply
wrong. Products liability cases are uniformly governed by a strict liabil-
ity standard.' Thus, as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
"one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused," regardless of whether the "seller has ex-
ercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product" or has
"entered into any contractual relation" with the user or consumer.'
It is apparent that what Olson actually deplores is not the ambiguity of
products liability law but the result. Today, because manufacturers are
strictly liable for the injuries their defective products cause, it is easier for
plaintiffs to sue manufacturers successfully for product defects. That re-
sult may be bad for business, but it is good, unambiguous protection for
consumers.
6 8
Similarly misguided is Olson's attack on contract law. Olson protests
that courts have eroded "freedom of contract" by recognizing such legal
"loopholes" as unconscionability and adhesion.69 Olson would have the
reader believe that contracts are routinely struck down as unconsciona-
ble. In reality, however, it is extremely rare that a court refuses to en-
force a contract on grounds of unconscionability or adhesion.7" Indeed,
a review of reported decisions last year reveals that no New York court
65. Id at 143-44.
66. See, e.g., Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Tortr
A Mirror Crack'd, 25 Gonz. L. Rev. 205, 207 (1990) (noting that "the concept [of strict
liability] and its elements have been clearly established and universally accepted"); W.
Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 97-98, at 690-94 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that
"nearly all states" have adopted some theory of strict products liability as enunciated by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A).
67. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977).
68. In the view of some recent commentators, even the notion that products liability
law is bad for business may be misguided because the current trend in products liability
law favors defendants. Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liabil-
ity: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 480-81 (1990).
69. See Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 197-219.
70. Even Olson admits that "[t]here is no need to overstate the case. Every day even
the judges most distrustful of markets still enforce contracts that they themselves would
never have signed, and even those most driven by sentiment continue to sigh and let the
less sympathetic side win many cases." Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 217; see
also T.P.K. Constr. Corp. v. Southern Am. Ins. Co., 752 F. Supp. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (it is the "exceptional case where a commercial contract may be found [to be]
unconscionable and against public policy"); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
135 A.D.2d 488, 491, 521 N.Y.S.2d 729, 732 (2d Dep't 1987) ("doctrine of unconsciona-
bility has little applicability in the commercial setting"), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 1, 534 N.E.2d
824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1988); State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 68, 468 N.Y.S.2d 131,
145 (2d Dep't 1983) (cases that "warrant a finding of unconscionability ... are the
exception"). Cf First Nat'l Stores v. Yellowstone Shopping Center., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630,
638, 237 N.E.2d 868, 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (1968) ("[s]tability of contract obliga-
tions must not be undermined by judicial sympathy") (emphasis omitted).
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voided any contract on grounds of unconscionability or adhesion.71 The
mere existence of these doctrines, however, is a comfort to those in the
free market who, because of the inferiority of their bargaining positions,
are not truly free to reject certain terms and conditions and therefore are
not truly free to contract. 72 For those rare occasions, we can all be
thankful that such doctrines exist.
At bottom, Olson dislikes any legal standard that permits trial by jury.
Olson argues that through our system we are "railroading defendants to
punishment under conditions in which no one can be sure they are
guilty."'73 He distrusts juries as anti-defendant,74 yet the very authorities
on which he relies reveal precisely the opposite. For example, Olson cites
a new Harvard study documenting that, in four out of five medical mal-
practice actions, the care given the patient was not in fact negligent."
He later acknowledges, however, that "[b]y far the majority of doctors
who go to trial on malpractice charges win their cases."' 76 Thus, as im-
perfect as it is, our jury system seems to work. In any event, it is far
preferable to Olson's alternative, which is no justice at all.
71. See, e.g., T.P.K. Construction, 752 F. Supp. at 110-11 (court rejected claim of
unconscionability); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. Envases Venezolanos,
S.A., 740 F. Supp. 260, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd sub nom First Nat'l Bank MD v.
Envases Venezolanos, 923 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1990); Rattigan v. Commodore Int'l, Ltd.,
739 F. Supp. 167, 170-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (court upheld liquidated damages clause chal-
lenged as excessive); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 735 F.
Supp. 1205, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (court rejected claim of unconscionability);
Balaklaw v. American Bd. of Anesthesiology, Inc., 149 Misc. 2d 11, 14, 562 N.Y.S.2d
360, 362-63 (Sup. Ct. Cortland County 1990) (court rejected claim that contract was
unenforceable as a contract of adhesion).
Similarly, over the past fifteen years, the New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly
rejected claims of unconscionability and adhesion. See, e.g., Sablosky v. Edward S.
Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 138-39, 535 N.E.2d 643, 647, 538 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1989)
(rejecting claims of unconscionability and adhesion); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1, 10-14, 534 N.E.2d 824, 828-30, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 791-93 (1988)
(rejecting claim of unconscionability); George Backer Mgmt. v. Acme Quilting Co., 46
N.Y.2d 211, 218, 385 N.E.2d 1062, 1065-66, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135, 138-39 (1978) (same);
Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 523, 344 N.E.2d 391,
396, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 464 (1976) (rejecting claims of unconscionability and adhesion).
72. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1948); Weaver v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 460-65, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-48 (1971); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 27-28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759-60 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-92, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 85-88, 95 (1960); see
also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 9-40, at 407 (3d ed. 1987) (noting that
"[t]ypically the cases in which unconscionability is found involve gross overall one-sided-
ness or gross one-sidedness of a term disclaiming a warranty, limiting damages, or grant-
ing procedural advantages" and that "inequality of bargaining power is an important
element in an unconscionability determination").
73. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 293.
74. See id. at 282-84, 292-93.
75. See id. at 6 (citing Huber, Malpractice Law-A Defective Product, Forbes, Apr.
16, 1990, at 154).
76. Id. at 164.
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IV. REMEDIES FOR REFORM
Olson places the blame for the "litigation explosion" squarely on the
lawyers who bring cases. Like Shakespeare, he too wants to "kill all the
lawyers" 7 --or at least their business. Olson aims to "make litigation an
exception, a last resort, a necessary evil at the margins of our common
life."78 This, he vows, will not be an easy fight, for:
[n]o great abuse was ever ended without a struggle. The industry that
has sprung up around contention and accusation is powerful. It will
not lightly give up its control of the machinery of judicial compulsion,
any more than other powerful classes will lightly give up the control of
tanks in countries where wars are carried on by means less subtle than
words.79
Underlying this strong rhetoric, however, is a series of sinister propos-
als that, by design, would undermine a plaintiff's ability to sue success-
fully. Olson proposes, among other things: (i) fee shifting so that the
losing party must pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees;' and
(ii) attorney liability so that the winning party can sue the losing party's
attorney over the conduct of the case." These proposals share a com-
mon purpose-namely, to raise the stakes of defeat so that fewer people
will sue.
Our system of civil justice has never been predicated on the notion that
one should be penalized just for having tried a case and lost. 2 For in-
stance, our courts have repeatedly rejected the so-called "English rule"
that requires the losing party to pay the legal costs of the winner.8 3
77. W. Shakespeare, supra note 1, act IV, scene II, lines 82-85.
78. Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 348.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 329-38.
81. See id. at 326-29.
82. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
("since litigation is at best uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit"); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 1): Preventing Frivolous Litigation
By Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 300, 305 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11] (noting that the "American rule" of no fee shifting
"reflects an equitable principle that penalizing a party for merely defending or prosecut-
ing a lawsuit is unfair" (citations omitted)).
83. The Supreme Court first rejected the "English rule" as early as 1796 and has
continued to adhere to that view in the almost two hundred years since then. See Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. lilderness Soc'v, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975); see also Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (first denying shifting of attorney's fees and
stating "[t]he general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it"); F.D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974) (rejecting
"English rule"); Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 717-18 (same); Stewart v. Sonneborn,
98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878) (same); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872)
(same); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230 (1872) (same). In Alyeska, the
Court reaffirmed the "American rule" that each party in a lawsuit bear its own attorney's
fees and overturned the lower court's award of attorneys' fees. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at
247. Moreover, the American rule continues to be followed by lower federal courts. See
Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc., 851 F.2d 790, 793-94 (6th Cir. 1988); Bittner v. Sadoff &
Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1984); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Omega
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Yet many commentators find it perfectly reasonable to "fee shift."84
Indeed, Vice President Dan Quayle recently endorsed that approach,85
and The Wall Street Journal agreed, saying: "This is fair since there is no
redress in 'winning' a lawsuit only to be saddled with huge legal bills." '86
In reality, however, fee shifting simply increases the burden on the
plaintiff, who must cope with the prospect of having to pay the defend-
ant's fees even in the event of a loss in a close case. Such an approach
would surely cripple civil rights litigation. One wonders, for example,
whether Thurgood Marshall could have afforded to bring Brown v. Board
of Education 87 -by no means a clear winner at the outset 88-- if he had to
fear that he and his client might be assessed the defendant's litigation
costs in that uphill battle. Indeed, the "chill" that Rule 11 sanctions8 9
are already having on creative advocacy' would be magnified dramati-
cally in an "English rule" system.9'
Travel, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1530 (4th Cir.
1990); Hookom v. Sensor, 121 F.R.D. 63, 64 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Anschutz Petroleum
Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
84. See, e.g., Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525-
26 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting) ("[w]e shall perhaps in the fullness of time
advance back to where we began... [to] the sensible proposition that the winner should
be made whole, including the recovery of attorney's fees"); Less Litigation, supra note 22,
at AS, cols. 4-5 (President's Council on Competitiveness, working group on Federal Jus-
tice Reform, recommends fee shifting to "encourage ... settlements and impose market
discipline on the litigation process"); Bork, supra note 6, at F1 (endorsing Olson's fee
shifting proposal).
85. See Margolick, supra note 19, at A14, col. 1.
86. American Competitiveness, supra note 22, at A8, col. 2.
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. For example, in an article published while Brown v. Board ofEducation was pend-
ing before the Supreme Court, Professors LeFlar and Davis hypothesized that there were
eleven different possible approaches for the Supreme Court to take in deciding the case,
and that more than half of those would have upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine.
See LeFlar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 387-
92 (1954); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (upholding "separate but
equal" doctrine and specifically condoning use of the doctrine in public schools); Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
518, 523-24 (1980) (noting that Brown represented a "sudden shift ... away from the
separate but equal doctrine and towards a commitment to desegregation" because the
question of school desegregation had come before the Supreme Court as early as 1850 in
the case of Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849), and for the next
hundred years the Court consistently adhered to the "separate but equal" doctrine).
89. Rule 11 allows for the imposition of sanctions upon attorneys and the parties they
represent when a court finds that a party lacked a "good faith" basis for filing a "plead-
ing, motion or other paper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In other words, a court may impose
sanctions whenever it finds that the filing is not "well grounded in fact and ... existing
law," is not "a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law," or is "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id. The sanctions available
under Rule 11 may include "the amount of reasonable expenses incurred by [the other
party or parties] because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
90. See supra note 37.
91. See Vairo, supra note 37, at 197.
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Just as importantly, fee shifting favors the "haves" and penalizes the
"have nots."9 2  Under fee-shifting, the well-heeled party-more often
than not the defendant--could better afford to take litigation risks. The
financially strapped party, in contrast, could ill afford defeat and would
therefore have to capitulate on terms favorable to the defendant or, worse
yet, refrain altogether from bringing suit, no matter how meritorious the
claim.
Proponents of the "English rule" have this clear aim: to provide pow-
erful disincentives to sue. They claim, as Vice President Quayle recently
put it, that "[o]ur system of civil justice" puts the United States at a
"self-inflicted competitive disadvantage."93 In other words, lawsuits are
bad for business and should be eliminated. Yet the Japanese, whose busi-
ness acumen we alternatively admire and envy, follow the "American
rule" to no apparent competitive disadvantage. 94 Thus, in one commen-
tator's view, "the case for English-style general indemnity has appeared
surprisingly weak.""'
In short, as one leading bar spokesman recently explained, fee shifting
would have a "chilling effect on individuals enforcing their legal
rights." 96 We have long erred on the side of permitting parties at least
the opportunity to have an impartial judge or jury determine their legal
rights.97 It would be a truly regressive step to impose so severe a tax on
92. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
93. Margolick, supra note 19, at A14, cols. 2-3.
94. See Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting:. A Critical Overview, 1982
Duke L.J. 651, 651 n.1 (1982). Indeed, the Japanese do not permit any fee shifting,
except for prevailing tort plaintiffs. See id. Under Japanese law, prevailing defendants
are never entitled to fees from losing plaintiffs. See id
95. Id at 679. Olson's argument for fee-shifting is further undercut by the fact that
the "time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what
constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial adminis-
tration." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
(citation omitted); accord Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 82, at 305.
96. Margolick, supra note 19, at A14, col. 3. (comments by John J. Curtin, Jr., Amer-
ican Bar Association President); see also Galen, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that fee shift-
ing "doesn't work when the playing field is uneven, as when an individual opposes a
corporation," that fee shifting is unwarranted because "even suits with merit can be lost
on technicalities," and that fee-shifting "would simply scare away many plaintiffs who
have in fact been wronged").
97. As one commentator has eloquently stated in defense of the "American Rule":
The American Rule has been perpetuated because it represents a democratic
ideal. Unfettered access to the courts for all citizens with genuine legal disputes
has become a cornerstone of the American concept of justice. All persons are
entitled to their day in court, however poor they may be and however rich their
opponents. The courts fear that injured parties, particularly those of modest
means, would be discouraged from invoking the judicial system if the cost of
losing an action included payment of one's opponent's legal bills.
Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 82, at 304-05 (citations omitted); see also
Mihalik v. Pro Arts, Inc., 851 F.2d 790, 793 (6th Cir. 1988) ("the American Rule empha-
size[s] equal access to justice").
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that right as the imposition of attorney's fees if the jury were to rule
against the party seeking redress.
CONCLUSION
Instead of penalizing people for litigating (as Olson would like to do),
we should be taking positive steps to protect litigants' rights. Olson may
be correct that we are experiencing a "litigation explosion." Neverthe-
less, his solution to make wholesale and arbitrary cuts in litigants' rights
could not be more wrong. To cope with this "explosion" and yet pre-
serve fundamental rights, we must devote more resources to the judicial
branch. We need more judges, more magistrates, and more courthouses.
For indigent civil plaintiffs, we need more court-appointed counsel to
assess in the first instance the merits of the claim and then to provide
proper representation.9"
Most importantly, we must resist the temptation to solve our courts'
congestion problems by the "quick fix" method of closing the courthouse
door. If we severely limit access to our courts, we will inflict the greatest
harm upon the very people who need our courts the most. And, in the
process, we will lose a most precious right-the right to be heard, to be
vindicated, to be made whole.
As this freight train of "reform" rumbles toward what may now be its
inevitable destination, I am reminded of a scribe's words about an earlier
time and a different debate: "There is more fear in this country than the
facts warrant. Beset by doubt, the nation listens to those who seem to
offer a cure, even though the medicine be more harmful than the
disease." 99
98. It is true that pro se litigation now clogs court dockets with sometimes frivolous
and often incomprehensible claims. We therefore do ourselves a disservice as a matter of
public policy by failing to recognize the vital role that court-appointed counsel can play
in civil cases to insure the orderly and coherent presentation of claims.
99. A.H. Sulzberger, Speech Upon Receiving Columbia College Distinguished Ser-
vice Award, 1952, reprinted in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 1020 (14th ed. 1968).
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